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Abstract: We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a
finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent
strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there
is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles
such that the set Yi contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others
are of types in Y−i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for
set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash
equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability
and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability.
Keywords: epistemic game theory; epistemic robustness; rationalizability; closedness under rational
behavior; mutual p-belief
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1. Introduction
In most applications of noncooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium is used as a tool to predict
behavior. Under what conditions, if any, is this approach justified? In his Ph.D. thesis, Nash [1]
suggested two interpretations of Nash equilibrium, one rationalistic, in which all players are fully
rational, know the game, and play it exactly once. In the other, “mass action” interpretation, there is
a large population of actors for each player role of the game, and now and then exactly one actor
from each player population is drawn at random to play the game in his or her player role, and this
is repeated (i.i.d.) indefinitely over time. Whereas the latter interpretation is studied in the literature
on evolutionary game theory and social learning, the former—which is the interpretation we will be
concerned with here—is studied in a sizeable literature on epistemic foundations of Nash equilibrium.
It is by now well-known from this literature that players’ rationality and beliefs or knowledge about the
game and each others’ rationality in general do not imply that they necessarily play a Nash equilibrium
or even that their conjectures about each others’ actions form a Nash equilibrium; see Bernheim [2],
Pearce [3], Aumann and Brandenburger [4].
The problem is not only a matter of coordination of beliefs (conjectures or expectations), as in
a game with multiple equilibria. It also concerns the fact that, in Nash equilibrium interpreted as
an equilibrium in belief (see [4], Theorems A and B), beliefs are supposed to correspond to specific
randomizations over the others’ strategies. In particular, a player might have opponents with multiple
pure strategies that maximize their expected payoffs, given their equilibrium beliefs. Hence, for these
opponents, any randomization over their pure best replies maximizes their expected payoffs. Yet
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in Nash equilibrium, the player is assumed to have a belief that singles out a randomization over
the best replies of her opponents that serves to keep this player indifferent across the support of
her equilibrium strategies, and ensures that none of the player’s other strategies are better replies.
In addition, a player’s belief concerning the behavior of others assigns positive probability only to best
replies; players are not allowed to entertain any doubt about the rationality of their opponents.
Our aim is to formalize a notion of epistemic robustness that relaxes these requirements. In order
to achieve this, we have to move away from point-valued to set-valued solution concepts. In line
with the terminology of epistemic game theory, let a player’s epistemic type correspond to a belief
over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. Assume that the epistemic model is complete in
the sense that all possible types are represented in the model. Let non-empty Cartesian products of
(pure-strategy or type) subsets be referred to as (strategy or type) blocks [5]. Say that a strategy block
X = X1 × · · · × Xn is epistemically robust if there exists a corresponding type block Y = Y1 × · · · ×Yn
such that: for each player i,
(I) the strategy subset Xi coincides with the set of best replies of the types in Yi;
(II) the set Yi contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of
types in Y−i and play best replies.
Here, for each player, (II) requires the player’s type subset to be robust in the sense of including all
possible probability distributions over opponent pure-strategy profiles that consist of best replies to
the beliefs of opponent types that are included in the opponents’ type subsets, even including player
types with a smidgen of doubt that only these strategies are played. In particular, our epistemic model
does not allow a player to pinpoint a specific opponent type or a specific best reply for an opponent
type that has multiple best replies. The purpose of (I) is, for each player, to map this robust type subset
into a robust subset of pure strategies by means of the best reply correspondence.
Consider, in contrast, the case where point (II) above is replaced by:
(II ′) the set Yi contains only player types that believe with probability 1 that the others are of types in
Y−i and play best replies.
Tan and Werlang [6] show that the strategy block X is a best reply set [3] if there exists a corresponding
type block Y such that (I) and (II ′) hold for all players. This epistemic characterization of a best reply
set X explains why, for each player i, all strategies in Xi are included. In contrast, the concept of
epistemic robustness explains why all strategies outside Xi are excluded, as a rational player will never
choose such a strategy, not even if the player with small probability believes that opponents will not
stick to their types Y−i or will not choose best replies.
Any strict Nash equilibrium, viewed as a singleton strategy block, is epistemically robust. In this
case, each player has opponents with unique pure strategies that maximize their expected payoffs,
given their equilibrium beliefs. The player’s equilibrium strategy remains her unique best reply, as
long as she is sufficiently sure that the others stick to their unique best replies. By contrast, non-strict
pure-strategy Nash equilibria by definition have ‘unused’ best replies and are consequently not
epistemically robust: a player, even if she is sure that her opponents strive to maximize their expected
payoffs given their equilibrium beliefs, might well believe that her opponents play such alternative
best replies.
In informal terms, our Proposition 1 establishes that epistemic robustness is sufficient and
necessary for the non-existence of such ‘unused’ best replies. Consequently, epistemic robustness
captures, through restrictions on the players’ beliefs, a property satisfied by strict Nash equilibria,
but not by non-strict pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The restrictions on players’ beliefs implied by
epistemic robustness can be imposed also on games without strict Nash equilibria. Indeed, our
Propositions 2–5 show how epistemic robustness is achieved by variants of CURB sets. A CURB set
(mnemonic for ‘closed under rational behavior’) is a strategy block that contains, for each player, all
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best replies to all probability distributions over the opponent strategies in the block1. Hence, if a player
believes that her opponents stick to strategies from their components of a CURB set, then she’d better
stick to her strategies as well.
A strategy block is fixed under rational behavior (FURB; or ‘tight’ CURB in the terminology of
Basu and Weibull [7]) if each player’s component not only contains, but is identical with the set of best
replies to all probability distributions over the opponent strategies in the block. Basu and Weibull [7]
show that minimal CURB (MINCURB) sets and the unique largest FURB set are important special cases
of FURB sets. The latter equals the strategy block of rationalizable strategies [2,3]. At the other extreme,
MINCURB is a natural set-valued generalization of strict Nash equilibrium. The main purpose of this
paper is to provide epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium.
Our results are not intended to advocate any particular point- or set-valued solution concept, only to
propose a definition of epistemic robustness and apply this to some set-valued solution concepts
currently in use2.
In order to illustrate our line of reasoning, consider first the two-player game
l c
u 3, 1 1, 2
m 0, 3 2, 1
In its unique Nash equilibrium, player 1’s equilibrium strategy assigns probability 2/3 to her first
pure strategy and player 2’s equilibrium strategy assigns probability 1/4 to his first pure strategy.
However, even if player 1’s belief about the behavior of player 2 coincides with his equilibrium strategy,
(1/4, 3/4), player 1 would be indifferent between her two pure strategies. Hence, any pure or mixed
strategy would be optimal for her, under the equilibrium belief about player 2. For all other beliefs
about her opponent’s behavior, only one of her pure strategies would be optimal, and likewise for
player 2. The unique CURB set and unique epistemically robust subset in this game is the full set
S = S1 × S2 of pure-strategy profiles.
Add a third pure strategy for each player to obtain the two-player game
l c r
u 3, 1 1, 2 0, 0
m 0, 3 2, 1 0, 0
d 5, 0 0, 0 6, 4
(1)
Strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1 , x
∗
2) =
((
2
3 ,
1
3 , 0
)
,
(
1
4 ,
3
4 , 0
))
is a Nash equilibrium (indeed a perfect and
proper equilibrium). However, if player 2’s belief concerning the behavior of 1 coincides with x∗1 , then
2 is indifferent between his pure strategies l and c, and if 1 assigns equal probability to these two pure
strategies of player 2, then 1 will play the unique best reply d, a pure strategy outside the support of
the equilibrium3. Moreover, if player 2 expects 1 to reason this way, then 2 will play r: the smallest
epistemically robust subset containing the support of the mixed equilibrium x∗ is the entire pure
1 CURB sets and variants were introduced by Basu and Weibull [7] and have since been used in many applications.
Several classes of adaptation processes eventually settle down in a minimal CURB set; see Hurkens [8], Sanchirico [9],
Young [10], and Fudenberg and Levine [11]. Moreover, minimal CURB sets give appealing results in communication
games [12,13] and network formation games [14]. For closure properties under generalizations of the best reply
correspondence, see Ritzberger and Weibull [15].
2 Clearly, if a strategy block is not epistemically robust, then our concept does not imply that players should or will avoid
strategies in the block.
3 We emphasize that we are concerned with rationalistic analysis of a game that is played once, and where players have
beliefs about the rationality and beliefs of their opponents. If the marginal of a player’s belief on an opponent’s strategy set
is non-degenerate—so that the player is uncertain about the behavior of the opponent—then this can be interpreted as the
player believing that the opponent is playing a mixed strategy.
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strategy space. By contrast, the pure-strategy profile (d, r) is a strict equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
no player has any alternative best reply and each equilibrium strategy remains optimal also under
some uncertainty as to the other player’s action: the set {d} × {r} is epistemically robust. In this game,
all pure strategies are rationalizable, S = S1 × S2 is a FURB set, and the game’s unique MINCURB set
(thus, the unique minimal FURB set) is T = {d} × {r}. These are also the epistemically robust subsets;
in particular, {u, m} × {l, c} is not epistemically robust.
Our results can be described as follows. First, the intuitive link between strict Nash equilibria
and our concept of epistemic robustness in terms of ruling out the existence of ‘unused’ best replies
is formalized in Proposition 1: a strategy block X is not epistemically robust if and only if for each
type block Y raised in its defense—so that X is the set of best reply profiles associated with Y—there
is a player i and a type ti with a best reply outside Xi, even if ti believes with high probability that
his opponents are of types in Y−i and play best replies. Second, in part (a) of Proposition 2, we
establish that epistemically robust strategy blocks are CURB sets. As a consequence (see [15]), every
epistemically robust strategy block contains at least one strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg
and Mertens [16]. In part (b) of Proposition 2, although not every CURB set is epistemically robust (since
a CURB set may contain non-best replies), we establish that every CURB set contains an epistemically
robust strategy block and we also characterize the largest such subset. As a by-product, we obtain the
existence of epistemically robust strategy blocks in all finite games. Third, in Proposition 3, we show
that a strategy block is FURB if and only if it satisfies the definition of epistemic robustness with equality,
rather than inclusion, in (II). FURB sets thus have a clean epistemic robustness characterization in the
present framework. Fourth, in Proposition 4, instead of starting with strategy blocks, we start from
a type block and show how an epistemically robust strategy block can be algorithmically obtained;
we also show that this is the smallest CURB set that contains all best replies for the initial type block.
Fifth, Proposition 5 shows how MINCURB sets (which are necessarily FURB and hence epistemically
robust) can be characterized by initiating the above algorithm with a single type profile, while no
proper subset has this property. We argue that this latter result shows how MINCURB sets capture
characteristics of strict Nash equilibrium.
As our notion of epistemic robustness checks for player types with ‘unused’ best replies on the
basis of their beliefs about the opponents’ types and rationality, we follow, for instance, Asheim [17]
and Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [18], and model players as having beliefs about the
opponents without modeling the players’ actual behavior. Moreover, we consider epistemic models
that are complete in the sense of including all possible beliefs. In these respects, our modeling differs
from that of Aumann and Brandenburger [4]’s characterization of Nash equilibrium. In other respects,
our modeling resembles that of Aumann and Brandenburger [4]. They assume that players’ beliefs
about opponent play is commonly known. Here, we require the existence of a type block Y and
consider, for each player i, types of player i who believe that opponent types are in Y−i. In addition, as
do Aumann and Brandenburger [4], we consider types of players that believe that their opponents are
rational.
The notion of persistent retracts [19] goes part of the way towards epistemic robustness. These are
product sets requiring the presence of at least one best reply to arbitrary beliefs close to the set. In
other words, they are robust against small belief perturbations, but admit alternative best replies
outside the set, in contrast to our concept of epistemic robustness. Moreover, as pointed out by
(van Damme [20] Section 4.5) and Myerson and Weibull [5], persistence is sensitive to certain game
details that might be deemed strategically inessential.
The present approach is related to Tercieux [21]’s analysis in its motivation in terms of epistemic
robustness of solution concepts and in its use of p-belief. His epistemic approach, however,
is completely different from ours. Starting from a two-player game, he introduces a Bayesian game
where payoff functions are perturbations of the original ones and he investigates which equilibria
are robust against this kind of perturbation. Zambrano [22] studies the stability of non-equilibrium
concepts in terms of mutual belief and is hence more closely related to our analysis. In fact, our
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Proposition 3 overlaps with but is distinct from his main results. Also Hu [23] restricts attention to
rationalizability, but allows for p-beliefs, where p < 1. In the games considered in Hu [23], pure
strategy sets are permitted to be infinite. By contrast, our analysis is restricted to finite games, but
under the weaker condition of mutual, rather than Hu [23]’s common, p-belief of opponent rationality
and of opponents’ types belonging to given type sets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the game theoretic
and epistemic definitions used. Section 3 characterizes variants of CURB sets in terms of epistemic
robustness. An appendix contains proofs of the propositions.
2. The Model
2.1. Game Theoretic Definitions
Consider a finite normal-form game 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is the non-empty
and finite set of players. Each player i ∈ N has a non-empty, finite set of pure strategies Si and a payoff
function ui : S → R defined on the set S := S1 × · · · × Sn of pure-strategy profiles. For any player i,
let S−i := ×j 6=iSj. It is over this set of other players’ pure-strategy combinations that player i will form
his or her probabilistic beliefs. These beliefs may, but need not be, product measures over the other
player’s pure-strategy sets. We extend the domain of the payoff functions to probability distributions
over pure strategies as usual.
For each player i ∈ N, pure strategy si ∈ Si, and probabilistic belief σ−i ∈ M(S−i), whereM(S−i)
is the set of all probability distributions on the finite set S−i, write
ui(si, σ−i) := ∑
s−i∈S−i
σ−i(s−i)ui(si, s−i).
Define i’s best reply correspondence βi :M(S−i)→ 2Si as follows: for all σ−i ∈ M(S−i),
βi(σ−i) := {si ∈ Si | ui(si, σ−i) ≥ ui(s′i, σ−i) for all s′i ∈ Si} .
Let S := {X ∈ 2S | ∅ 6= X = X1 × · · · × Xn} denote the collection of strategy blocks. For X ∈ S , we
abuse notation slightly by writing, for each i ∈ N, βi(M(X−i)) as βi(X−i). Let β(X) := β1(X−1)×
· · · × βn(X−n). Each constituent set βi(X−i) ⊆ Si in this strategy block is the set of best replies of
player i to all probabilistic beliefs over the others’ strategy choices X−i ⊆ S−i.
Following Basu and Weibull [7], a set X ∈ S is:
closed under rational behavior (CURB) if β(X) ⊆ X;
fixed under rational behavior (FURB) if β(X) = X;
minimal CURB (MINCURB) if it is CURB and does not properly contain another one: β(X) ⊆ X
and there is no X′ ∈ S with X′ ( X and β(X′) ⊆ X′.
Basu and Weibull [7] call a FURB set a ‘tight’ CURB set. The reversed inclusion, X ⊆ β(X), is the best
reply property ([3] p. 1033). It is shown in (Basu and Weibull [7] Propositions 1 and 2) that a MINCURB
set exists, that all MINCURB sets are FURB, and that the block of rationalizable strategies is the game’s
largest FURB set. While Basu and Weibull [7] require that players believe that others’ strategy choices
are statistically independent, σ−i ∈ ×j 6=iM(Sj), we here allow players to believe that others’ strategy
choices are correlated, σ−i ∈ M(S−i)4. Our results carry over—with minor modifications in the
proofs—to the case of independent strategy choices. Thus, in games with more than two players,
the present definition of CURB is somewhat more demanding than that in Basu and Weibull [7], in the
4 In doing so, we follow (Osborne and Rubinstein [24] Chapter 5).
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sense that we require closedness under a wider space of beliefs. Hence, the present definition may,
in games with more than two players, lead to different MINCURB sets5.
2.2. Epistemic Definitions
The epistemic analysis builds on the concept of player types, where a type of a player is
characterized by a probability distribution over the others’ strategies and types.
For each i ∈ N, denote by Ti player i’s non-empty type space. The state space is defined byΩ := S×T ,
where T := T1 × · · · × Tn. For each player i ∈ N, write Ωi := Si × Ti and Ω−i := ×j 6=iΩj. To each
type ti ∈ Ti of every player i is associated a probabilistic belief µi(ti) ∈ M(Ω−i), where M(Ω−i)
denotes the set of Borel probability measures on Ω−i endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
For each player i, we thus have the player’s pure-strategy set Si, type space Ti and a mapping
µi : Ti →M(Ω−i) that to each of i’s types ti assigns a probabilistic belief, µi(ti), over the others’ strategy
choices and types. Assume that, for each i ∈ N, µi is continuous and Ti is compact. The structure
(S1, . . . , Sn, T1, . . . , Tn,µ1, . . . ,µn) is called an S-based (interactive) probability structure. Assume in addition
that, for each i ∈ N, µi is onto: all Borel probability measures onΩ−i are represented in Ti. A probability
structure with this additional property is called complete.6 The completeness of the probability structure
is essential for our analysis and results. In particular, the assumption of completeness is invoked in
all proofs.
For each i ∈ N, denote by si(ω) and ti(ω) i’s strategy and type in state ω ∈ Ω. In other words,
si : Ω → Si is the projection of the state space to i’s strategy set, assigning to each state ω ∈ Ω the
strategy si = si(ω) that i uses in that state. Likewise, ti : Ω→ Ti is the projection of the state space to
i’s type space. For each player i ∈ N and positive probability p ∈ (0, 1], the p-belief operator Bpi maps
each event (Borel-measurable subset of the state space) E ⊆ Ω to the set of states where player i’s type
attaches at least probability p to E:
Bpi (E) := {ω ∈ Ω | µi(ti(ω))(Eωi ) ≥ p} ,
where Eωi := {ω−i ∈ Ω−i | (ωi,ω−i) ∈ E}. This is the same belief operator as in Hu [23]7. One may
interpret Bpi (E) as the event ‘player i believes E with probability at least p’. For all p ∈ (0, 1], B
p
i
satisfies Bpi (∅) = ∅, B
p
i (Ω) = Ω, B
p
i (E
′) ⊆ Bpi (E′′) if E′ ⊆ E′′ (monotonicity), and B
p
i (E) = E if
E = projΩi E×Ω−i. The last property means that each player i always p-believes his own strategy-type
pair, for any positive probability p. Since also Bpi (E) = projΩi B
p
i (E) ×Ω−i for all events E ⊆ Ω,
each operator Bpi satisfies both positive (B
p
i (E) ⊆ B
p
i (B
p
i (E))) and negative (¬B
p
i (E) ⊆ B
p
i (¬B
p
i (E))
introspection. For all p ∈ (0, 1], Bpi violates the truth axiom, meaning that B
p
i (E) ⊆ E need not hold
for all E ⊆ Ω. In the special case p = 1, we have Bpi (E′) ∩ B
p
i (E
′′) ⊆ Bpi (E′ ∩ E′′) for all E′, E′′ ⊆ Ω.
Finally, note that Bpi (E) is monotone with respect to p in the sense that, for all E ⊆ Ω, B
p′
i (E) ⊇ B
p′′
i (E)
if p′ < p′′.
We connect types with the payoff functions by defining i’s choice correspondence Ci : Ti → 2Si
as follows: For each of i’s types ti ∈ Ti,
Ci(ti) := βi(margS−i µi(ti))
5 We also note that a pure strategy is a best reply to some belief σ−i ∈ M(S−i) if and only if it is not strictly dominated
(by any pure or mixed strategy). This follows from Lemma 3 in Pearce [3], which, in turn, is closely related to
(Ferguson [25] p. 86, Theorem 1) and (van Damme [26] Lemma 3.2.1).
6 An adaptation of the proof of (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [18] Proposition 7.2) establishes the existence of
such a complete probability structure under the assumption that, for all i ∈ N, player i’s type space Ti is Polish (separable
and completely metrizable). The exact result we use is Proposition 6.1 in an earlier working paper version [27]. Existence
can also be established by constructing a universal state space [28,29].
7 See also Monderer and Samet [30].
Games 2016, 7, 37 7 of 16
consists of i’s best replies when player i is of type ti. Let T := {Y ∈ 2T | ∅ 6= Y = Y1× · · ·×Yn} denote
the collection of type blocks. For any such set Y ∈ T and player i ∈ N, write Ci(Yi) := ⋃ti∈Yi Ci(ti) and
C(Y) := C1(Y1)× · · · × Cn(Yn). In other words, these are the choices and choice profiles associated
with Y. If Y ∈ T and i ∈ N, write
[Yi] := {ω ∈ Ω | ti(ω) ∈ Yi}.
This is the event that player i is of a type in the subset Yi. Likewise, write [Y] :=
⋂
i∈N [Yi] for the event
that the type profile is in Y. Finally, for each player i ∈ N, write Ri for the event that player i uses a
best reply:
Ri := {ω ∈ Ω | si(ω) ∈ Ci(ti(ω))}.
One may interpret Ri as the event that i is rational: if ω ∈ Ri, then si(ω) is a best reply to
margS−iµi(ti(ω)).
3. Epistemic Robustness
We define a strategy block X ∈ S to be epistemically robust if there exists a p¯ < 1 such that, for
each probability p ∈ [ p¯, 1], there is a type block Y ∈ T (possibly dependent on p) such that
C(Y) = X (2)
and
Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
)) ⊆ [Yi] for all i ∈ N . (3)
Hence, epistemic robustness requires the existence of a type block Y satisfying, for each player i, that Xi
is the set of best replies of the types in Yi, and that every type of player i who p-believes that opponents
are rational and of types in Y−i is included in Yi. Condition (2) is thus not an equilibrium condition
as it is not interactive: it relates each player’s type subset to the same player’s strategy subset. The
interactivity enters through condition (3), which relates each player’s type subset to the type subsets of
the other players. For each p < 1, condition (3) allows each player i to attach a positive probability
to the event that others do not play best replies and/or are of types outside Y. It follows from the
monotonicity of Bpi (·) with respect to p that, for a fixed type block Y, if inclusion (3) is satisfied for
p = p¯, then inclusion (3) is satisfied also for all p ∈ ( p¯, 1].
Note that if condition (2) is combined with a variant of condition (3), with the weak inclusion
reversed and p set to 1, then we obtain a characterization of Pearce [3]’s best reply set; see [6].
In line with what we mentioned in the introduction, we can now formally show that if s ∈ S
is a strict Nash equilibrium, then {s} is epistemically robust. To see this, define for all i ∈ N,
Yi := {ti ∈ Ti | Ci(ti) = {si}}. Since the game is finite, there is, for each player i ∈ N, a pi ∈ (0, 1)
such that βi(σ−i) = {si} for all σ−i ∈ M(S−i) with σ−i({s−i}) ≥ pi. Let p = max{p1, . . . , pn}. Then it
holds for each p ∈ [p, 1]:
Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
)) ⊆ Bpi ({ω ∈ Ω | ∀j 6= i, sj(ω) ∈ Xj}) ⊆ [Yi] for all i ∈ N .
Thus, by condition (2) and condition (3), {s} is epistemically robust.
Also, as discussed in the introduction, non-strict pure-strategy Nash equilibria have ‘unused’
best replies. Our first result demonstrates that epistemic robustness is sufficient and necessary for the
non-existence of such ‘unused’ best replies.
Proposition 1. The following two statements are equivalent:
(a) X ∈ S is not epistemically robust.
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(b) For all p¯ < 1, there exists p ∈ [ p¯, 1] such that if Y ∈ T satisfies C(Y) = X, then there exist i ∈ N and
ti ∈ Ti such that C(ti) * Xi and [{ti}] ⊆ Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
.
Hence, while an epistemically robust subset is defined by a set of profiles of player types, it
suffices with one player and one possible type of this player to determine that a strategy block is not
epistemically robust.
We now relate epistemically robust subsets to CURB sets. To handle the fact that all strategy
profiles in any epistemically robust subset are profiles of best replies, while CURB sets may involve
strategies that are not best replies, introduce the following notation: For each i ∈ N and Xi ⊆ Si, let
β−1i (Xi) := {σ−i ∈ M(S−i) | βi(σ−i) ⊆ Xi}
denote the pre-image (upper inverse) of Xi under player i’s best reply correspondence8. For a given
subset Xi of i’s pure strategies, β−1i (Xi) consists of the beliefs over others’ strategy profiles having the
property that all best replies to these beliefs are contained in Xi.
Proposition 2. Let X ∈ S .
(a) If X is epistemically robust, then X is a CURB set.
(b) If X is a CURB set, then ×i∈Nβi(β−1i (Xi)) ⊆ X is epistemically robust. Furthermore, it is the largest
epistemically robust subset of X.
Claim (a) implies that every epistemically robust subset contains at least one strategically stable
set, both as defined in Kohlberg and Mertens [16] and as defined in Mertens [32], see Ritzberger
and Weibull [15] and Demichelis and Ritzberger [33], respectively9. Claim (a) also implies that
subsets of epistemically robust sets need not be epistemically robust. Concerning claim (b), note that
×i∈Nβi(β−1i (Si)) equals the set of profiles of pure strategies that are best replies to some belief. Hence,
since for each i ∈ N, both βi(·) and β−1i (·) are monotonic with respect to set inclusion, it follows
from Proposition 2(b) that any epistemically robust subset involves only strategies surviving one
round of strict elimination. Thus, ×i∈Nβi(β−1i (Si)) is the largest epistemically robust subset, while the
characterization of the smallest one(s) will be dealt with by Proposition 5.
Our proof shows that Proposition 2(a) can be slightly strengthened, as one only needs the
robustness conditions with p = 1; as long as there is a Y ∈ T such that C(Y) = X and condition (3)
holds with p = 1, X is CURB.10 Moreover, although epistemic robustness allows that Y ∈ T depends
on p, the proof of (b) defines Y independently of p.
The following result shows that FURB sets are characterized by epistemic robustness when player
types that do not believe with sufficient probability that the others play best replies are removed:
Proposition 3. The following two statements are equivalent:
(a) X ∈ S is a FURB set.
(b) There exists a p¯ < 1 such that, for each probability p ∈ [ p¯, 1], there is a type block Y ∈ T satisfying
condition (2) such that condition (3) holds with equality.
The block of rationalizable strategies [2,3] is the game’s largest FURB set [7]. Thus, it follows from
Proposition 3 that epistemic robustness yields a characterization of the block of rationalizable strategies,
8 Harsanyi and Selten [31] refer to such pre-images of strategy sets as stability sets.
9 In fact, these inclusions hold under the slightly weaker definition of CURB sets in Basu and Weibull [7], in which a player’s
belief about other players is restricted to be a product measure over the others’ pure-strategy sets.
10 In the appendix we also prove that if p ∈ (0, 1] and Y ∈ T are such that C(Y) = X and (3) holds for all i ∈ N, then X is a
p-best reply set in the sense of Tercieux [21].
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without involving any explicit assumption of common belief of rationality. Instead, only mutual p-belief
of rationality and type sets are assumed. Proposition 3 also applies to MINCURB sets, as these sets are
FURB. In particular, it follows from Propositions 2(a) and 3 that a strategy block is MINCURB if and
only if it is a minimal epistemically robust subset11.
As much of the literature on CURB sets (recall footnote 1) focuses on minimal ones, we now turn
to how smallest CURB sets can be characterized in terms of epistemic robustness. This characterization
is presented through Propositions 4 and 5.
Proposition 4 starts from an arbitrary block Y of types and generates an epistemically robust
subset by including all beliefs over the opponents’ best replies, and all beliefs over opponents’ types
that have such beliefs over their opponents, and so on. Formally, define for any Y ∈ T the sequence
〈Y(k)〉k by Y(0) = Y and, for each k ∈ N and i ∈ N,
[Yi(k)] := [Yi(k− 1)] ∪ B1i
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj(k− 1)]
))
. (4)
Define the correspondence E : T → 2S, for any Y ∈ T , by
E(Y) := C
(⋃
k∈NY(k)
)
.
We show that the strategy block E(Y) of best replies is epistemically robust and is the smallest CURB
set that includes C(Y).12
Proposition 4. Let Y ∈ T . Then X = E(Y) is the smallest CURB set satisfying C(Y) ⊆ X. Furthermore,
E(Y) is epistemically robust.
Remark 1. If the strategy block C(Y) contains strategies that are not rationalizable, then E(Y) will not be FURB.
Therefore, the epistemic robustness of E(Y) does not follow from Proposition 3; its robustness is established by
invoking Proposition 2(b).
Note that if a strategy block X is epistemically robust, then there exists a type block Y
satisfying condition (2) such that condition (3) is satisfied for p = 1. Thus, X = C(Y) = E(Y), showing
that all epistemically robust strategy blocks can be obtained using the algorithm of Proposition 4.
The final Proposition 5 shows how MINCURB sets can be characterized by epistemically robust
subsets obtained by initiating the algorithm of Proposition 4 with a single type profile: a strategy block
X is a MINCURB set if and only if (a) the algorithm leads to X from a single type profile, and (b) no
single type profile leads to a strict subset of X.
Proposition 5. X ∈ S is a MINCURB set if and only if there exists a t ∈ T such that E({t}) = X and there
exists no t′ ∈ T such that E({t′}) ( X.
Strict Nash equilibria (interpreted as equilibria in beliefs) satisfy ‘coordination’, in the sense that
there is mutual belief about the players’ sets of best replies, ‘concentration’, in the sense that each player
has only one best reply, and epistemic robustness (as defined here), implying that each player’s set of
beliefs about opponent choices contains all probability distributions over opponent strategies that are
best replies given their beliefs. In Proposition 5, starting with a single type profile t that corresponds to
‘coordination’, using the algorithm of Proposition 4 and ending up with E({t}) = X ensures epistemic
11 We thank Peter Wikman for this observation.
12 For each strategy block X ∈ S , there exists a unique smallest CURB set X′ ∈ S with X ⊆ X′ (that is, X′ is a subset of all CURB
sets X′′ that include X). To see that this holds for all finite games, note that the collection of CURB sets including a given block
X ∈ S is non-empty and finite, and that the intersection of two CURB sets that include X is again a CURB set including X.
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robustness, while the non-existence of t′ ∈ T such that E({t′}) is a proper subset of X corresponds to
‘concentration’. Hence, these three characteristics of strict Nash equilibria characterize MINCURB sets
in Proposition 5.
In order to illustrate Propositions 4 and 5, consider the Nash equilibrium x∗ in game (1) in the
introduction. This equilibrium corresponds to a type profile (t1, t2) where t1 assigns probability 1/4
to (l, t2) and probability 3/4 to (c, t2), and where t2 assigns probability 2/3 to (u, t1) and probability
1/3 to (m, t1). We have that C({t1, t2}) = {u, m} × {l, c}, while the full strategy space S is the smallest
CURB set that includes C({t1, t2}). Proposition 4 shows that C({t1, t2}) is not epistemically robust,
since it does not coincide with the smallest CURB set that includes it. Recalling the discussion from the
introduction: if player 2’s belief concerning the behavior of 1 coincides with x∗1 , then 2 is indifferent
between his pure strategies l and c, and if 1 assigns equal probability to these two pure strategies of
player 2, then 1 will play the unique best reply d, a pure strategy outside the support of the equilibrium.
Moreover, if player 2 expects 1 to reason this way, then 2 will play r. Hence, to assure epistemic
robustness, starting from type set {t1, t2}, the repeated inclusion of all beliefs over opponents’ best
replies eventually leads to the smallest CURB set, here S, that includes the Nash equilibrium that was
our initial point of departure. By contrast, for the type profile (t′1, t
′
2) where t
′
1 assigns probability 1
to (r, t′2) and t′2 assigns probability 1 to (d, t′1) we have that C({t′1, t′2}) = {(d, r)} coincides with the
smallest CURB set that includes it. Thus, the strict equilibrium (d, r) to which (t′1, t
′
2) corresponds is
epistemically robust, when viewed as a singleton set. Furthermore, by Proposition 5, {(d, r)} is the
unique MINCURB set.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let T (X) := {Y ∈ T | C(Y) = X} denote the collection of type blocks having
the property that X is the strategy block of best replies. By the completeness of the probability structure,
we have that T (X) is non-empty if and only if X ⊆ ×i∈Nβi(β−1i (Si)). Furthermore, by completeness,
if T (X) is non-empty, then T (X) has a largest element, Y¯(X), which is constructed by letting
Y¯i(X) = {ti ∈ Ti | Ci(ti) ⊆ Xi} for all i ∈ N.
By the definition of epistemic robustness, a strategy block X ∈ S is not epistemically robust if and
only if, for all p¯ < 1, there exists p ∈ [ p¯, 1] such that for all Y ∈ T (X), there exists i ∈ N such that
Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
* [Yi] .
Hence, X ∈ S is not epistemic robust if and only if
(∗) X * ×i∈Nβi(β−1i (Si)) so that T (X) = ∅, or
(∗∗) X ⊆ ×i∈Nβi(β−1i (Si)) so that T (X) 6= ∅, and, for all p¯ < 1, there exists p ∈ [ p¯, 1] such that if
Y ∈ T (X), then there exist i ∈ N and ti /∈ Yi such that
[{ti}] ⊆ Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
.
(b) implies (a). Assume that, for all p¯ < 1, there exists p ∈ [ p¯, 1] such that if Y ∈ T (X), then there
exist i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti such that C(ti) * Xi and [{ti}] ⊆ Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
. Note that if Y ∈ T (X)
and C(ti) * Xi, then ti /∈ Yi.
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Either T (X) = ∅, so that (∗) is satisfied, or T (X) 6= ∅ and, for all p¯ < 1, there exists p ∈ [ p¯, 1]
such that if Y ∈ T (X), then there exist i ∈ N and ti /∈ Yi such that [{ti}] ⊆ Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
,
so that (∗∗) is satisfied.
(a) implies (b). Assume that (∗) or (∗∗) is satisfied.
Assume that (∗) is satisfied, and fix p < 1. Then, it holds trivially that if Y ∈ T (X), then there
exist i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti such that C(ti) * Xi and [{ti}] ⊆ Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
.
Assume that (∗∗) is satisfied. Then, since Y¯(X) ∈ T (X), it must also hold that for all
p¯ < 1, there exist p( p¯) ∈ [ p¯, 1], i( p¯) ∈ N and ti( p¯)( p¯) /∈ Y¯i( p¯)(X) such that [{ti( p¯)( p¯)}] ⊆
Bp( p¯)i( p¯)
(⋂
j 6=i( p¯)
(
Rj ∩ [Y¯j(X)]
))
. By the definition of Y¯(X), C(ti( p¯)( p¯)) * Xi( p¯). It is sufficient to
construct, for all p¯ < 1 and Y ∈ T (X), a type ti( p¯) ∈ Ti such that C(ti( p¯)) = C(ti( p¯)( p¯)) and
[{ti( p¯)}] ⊆ Bp( p¯)i( p¯)
(⋂
j 6=i( p¯)
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
.
For all s−i( p¯) ∈ X−i( p¯) with margS−i( p¯)µ−i( p¯)(ti( p¯)( p¯))(s−i( p¯)) > 0, select t−i( p¯) ∈ Y−i( p¯) such that
sj ∈ Cj(tj) for all j 6= i( p¯) (which exists since C(Y) = X) and let
µi( p¯)(ti( p¯))(s−i( p¯), t−i( p¯)) = margS−i( p¯)µ−i( p¯)(ti( p¯)( p¯))(s−i( p¯)) .
For all s−i( p¯) /∈ X−i( p¯) with margS−i( p¯)µ−i( p¯)(ti( p¯)( p¯))(s−i( p¯)) > 0, select t−i( p¯) ∈ Y−i( p¯) arbitrary and
let again
µi( p¯)(ti( p¯))(s−i( p¯), t−i( p¯)) = margS−i( p¯)µ−i( p¯)(ti( p¯)( p¯))(s−i( p¯)) .
Then margS−i( p¯)µ−i( p¯)(ti( p¯))(s−i( p¯)) = margS−i( p¯)µ−i( p¯)(ti( p¯)( p¯))(s−i( p¯)), implying that C(ti( p¯)) =
C(ti( p¯)( p¯)). Furthermore, by the construction of ti( p¯):
µi( p¯)(ti( p¯))
(
{(s−i( p¯), t−i( p¯)) ∈ S−i( p¯) ×Y−i( p¯) | sj ∈ Cj(tj) for all j 6= i( p¯)}
)
= µi( p¯)(ti( p¯))
(
X−i( p¯) × T−i( p¯)
)
= µi( p¯)(ti( p¯)( p¯))
(
X−i( p¯) × T−i( p¯)
)
≥ µi( p¯)(ti( p¯)( p¯))
(
{(s−i( p¯), t−i( p¯)) ∈ S−i( p¯) × Y¯−i( p¯)(X) | sj ∈ Cj(tj) for all j 6= i( p¯)}
)
≥ p( p¯),
since C(Y) = X = C(Y¯(X)).13 Thus, [{ti( p¯)}] ⊆ Bp( p¯)i( p¯)
(⋂
j 6=i( p¯)
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
.
Proof of Proposition 2. Part (a). By assumption, there is a Y ∈ T with C(Y) = X such that for each
i ∈ N, B1i
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
)) ⊆ [Yi].
Fix i ∈ N, and consider any σ−i ∈ M(X−i). Since C(Y) = X, it follows that, for each s−i ∈ S−i
with σ−i(s−i) > 0, there exists t−i ∈ Y−i such that, for all j 6= i, sj ∈ Cj(tj). Hence, since the probability
structure is complete, there exists a
ω ∈ B1i
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
)) ⊆ [Yi]
13 To see that the first equality in the expression above holds, note first that, since C(Y) = X,
{(s−i( p¯), t−i( p¯)) ∈ S−i( p¯) ×Y−i( p¯) | sj ∈ Cj(tj) for all j 6= i( p¯)} ⊆ X−i( p¯) × T−i( p¯) .
However, by construction, for any (s−i( p¯), t−i( p¯)) ∈ X−i( p¯) × T−i( p¯) assigned positive probability by µi( p¯)(ti( p¯)), it is the case
that t−i( p¯) ∈ Y−i( p¯) and sj ∈ Cj(tj) for all j 6= i( p¯). Hence, the two sets are given the same probability by µi( p¯)(ti( p¯)).
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with margS−i µi(ti(ω)) = σ−i. So
βi(X−i) := βi(M(X−i)) ⊆
⋃
ti∈Yiβi(margS−i µi(ti)) := Ci(Yi) = Xi .
Since this holds for all i ∈ N, X is a CURB set.
Part (b). Assume that X ∈ S is a CURB set, i.e., X satisfies β(X) ⊆ X. It suffices to prove that
×i∈Nβi(β−1i (Xi)) ⊆ X is epistemically robust. That it is the largest epistemically robust subset of X
then follows immediately from the fact that, for each i ∈ N, both βi(·) and β−1i (·) are monotonic with
respect to set inclusion.
Define Y ∈ T by taking, for each i ∈ N, Yi := {ti ∈ Ti | Ci(ti) ⊆ Xi}. Since
the probability structure is complete, it follows that Ci(Yi) = βi(β−1i (Xi)). For notational
convenience, write X′i = βi(β
−1
i (Xi)) and X
′ = ×i∈N X′i . Since the game is finite, there is,
for each player i ∈ N, a pi ∈ (0, 1) such that βi(σ−i) ⊆ βi(X′−i) for all σ−i ∈ M(S−i) with
σ−i(X′−i) ≥ pi. Let p = max{p1, . . . , pn}.
We first show that β(X′) ⊆ X′. By definition, X′ ⊆ X, so for each i ∈ N: M(X′−i) ⊆ M(X−i).
Moreover, as β(X) ⊆ X and, for each i ∈ N, βi(Xi) := βi(M(X−i)), it follows thatM(X−i) ⊆ β−1i (Xi).
Hence, for each i ∈ N,
βi(X′i) := βi(M(X′−i)) ⊆ βi(M(X−i)) ⊆ βi(β−1i (Xi)) = X′i .
For all p ∈ [p, 1] and i ∈ N, we have that
Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i(Rj ∩ [Yj])
)
= Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i{ω ∈ Ω | sj(ω) ∈ Cj(tj(ω)) ⊆ X
′
j}
)
⊆
{
ω ∈ Ω | µi(ti(ω)){ω−i ∈ Ω−i | for all j 6= i, sj(ω) ∈ X′j} ≥ p
}
⊆ {ω ∈ Ω | margS−i µi(ti(ω))(X′−i) ≥ p}
⊆ {ω ∈ Ω | Ci(ti(ω)) ⊆ βi(X′−i)}
⊆ {ω ∈ Ω | Ci(ti(ω)) ⊆ X′−i} = [Yi],
using β(X′) ⊆ X′.
For X ∈ S and p ∈ (0, 1], write, for each i ∈ N,
β
p
i (X−i) := {si ∈ Si | ∃σ−i ∈ M(S−i) with σ−i(X−i) ≥ p
such that ui(si, σ−i) ≥ ui(s′i, σ−i) ∀s′i ∈ Si} .
Let βp(X) := βp1(X−1)× · · · × βpn(X−n). Following Tercieux [21], a set X ∈ S is a p-best reply set if
βp(X) ⊆ X.
Claim: Let X ∈ S and p ∈ (0, 1]. If Y ∈ T is such that C(Y) = X and condition (3) holds for each i ∈ N,
then X is a p-best reply set.
Proof. By assumption, there is a Y ∈ T with C(Y) = X such that for each i ∈ N,
Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
)) ⊆ [Yi].
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Fix i ∈ N and consider any σ−i ∈ M(S−i) with σ−i(X−i) ≥ p. Since C(Y) = X, it follows that,
for each s−i ∈ X−i, there exists t−i ∈ Y−i such that sj ∈ Cj(tj) for all j 6= i. Hence, since the probability
structure is complete, there exists a
ω ∈ Bpi
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
)) ⊆ [Yi]
with margS−i µi(ti(ω)) = σ−i. Thus, by definition of β
p
i (X−i):
β
p
i (X−i) ⊆
⋃
ti∈Yiβi(margS−i µi(ti)) := Ci(Yi) = Xi .
Since this holds for all i ∈ N, X is a p-best reply set.
Proof of Proposition 3. (b) implies (a). By assumption, there is a Y ∈ T with C(Y) = X such that for
all i ∈ N, B1i
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
= [Yi].
Fix i ∈ N. Since C(Y) = X, and the probability structure is complete, there exists, for any
σ−i ∈ M(S−i), an
ω ∈ B1i
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj]
))
= [Yi]
with margS−i µi(ti(ω)) = σ−i if and only if σ−i ∈ M(X−i). Thus,
βi(X−i) := βi(M(X−i)) =
⋃
ti∈Yiβi(margS−i µi(ti)) := Ci(Yi) = Xi .
Since this holds for all i ∈ N, X is a FURB set.
(a) implies (b). Assume that X ∈ S satisfies X = β(X). Since the game is finite, there exists, for each
player i ∈ N, a pi ∈ (0, 1) such that βi(σ−i) ⊆ βi(X−i) if σ−i(X−i) ≥ pi. Let p = max{p1, . . . , pn}.
For each p ∈ [p, 1], construct the sequence of type blocks 〈Yp(k)〉k as follows: for each i ∈ N,
let Ypi (0) = {ti ∈ Ti | Ci(ti) ⊆ Xi}. Using continuity of µi, the correspondence Ci : Ti ⇒ Si is upper
hemi-continuous. Thus Ypi (0) ⊆ Ti is closed, and, since Ti is compact, so is Y
p
i (0). There exists a closed
set Ypi (1) ⊆ Ti such that
[Ypi (1)] = B
p
i
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Ypj (0)]
))
.
It follows that Ypi (1) ⊆ Y
p
i (0). Since Y
p
i (0) is compact, so is Y
p
i (1). By induction,
[Ypi (k)] = B
p
i
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Ypj (k− 1)]
))
(A1)
defines, for each player i, a decreasing chain
〈
Ypi (k)
〉
k
of compact and non-empty subsets: Ypi (k+ 1) ⊆ Y
p
i (k)
for all k. By the finite-intersection property, Ypi :=
⋂
k∈NY
p
i (k) is a non-empty and compact subset
of Ti. For each k, let Yp(k) = ×i∈NYpi (k) and let Yp :=
⋂
k∈NYp(k). Again, these are non-empty and
compact sets.
Next, C(Yp(0)) = β (X), since the probability structure is complete. Since X is FURB, we thus have
C(Yp(0)) = X. For each i ∈ N,
[Ypi (1)] ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω |margS−i µi(ti(ω))(X−i) ≥ p} ,
implying that Ci(Y
p
i (1)) ⊆ βi(X−i) = Xi by the construction of p. Moreover, since the probability
structure is complete, for each i ∈ N and σ−i ∈ M(X−i), there exists ω ∈ [Ypi (1)] = B
p
i
(⋂
j6=i(Rj ∩
[Ypj (0)])
)
with margS−iµi(ti(ω)) = σ−i, implying that Ci(Y
p
i (1)) ⊇ βi(X−i) = Xi. Hence, Ci(Y
p
i (1)) =
βi(X−i) = Xi. By induction, it holds for all k ∈ N that C(Yp(k)) = β(X) = X . Since
〈
Ypi (k)
〉
k
is a decreasing chain, we also have that C(Yp) ⊆ X. The converse inclusion follows by upper
hemi-continuity of the correspondence C. To see this, suppose that xo ∈ X but xo /∈ C (Yp). Since xo ∈ X,
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xo ∈ C (Yp (k)) for all k. By the Axiom of Choice: for each k, there exists a yk ∈ Yp (k) such that
(yk, xo) ∈ graph (C). By the Bolzano–Weierstrass Theorem, we can extract a convergent subsequence
for which yk → yo, where yo ∈ Yp, since Yp is closed. Moreover, since the correspondence C is
closed-valued and upper hemi-continuous, with S compact (it is in fact finite), graph (C) ⊆ T× S is
closed, and thus (yo, xo) ∈ graph (C), contradicting the hypothesis that xo /∈ C (Yp). This establishes the
claim that C(Yp) ⊆ X.
It remains to prove that, for each i ∈ N, condition (3) holds with equation for Yp. Fix i ∈ N, and let
Ek =
⋂
j6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Ypj (k)]
)
and E =
⋂
j6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Ypj ]
)
.
Since, for each j ∈ N, 〈Ypj (k)〉k is a decreasing chain with limit Y
p
j , it follows that 〈Ek〉k is a decreasing
chain with limit E.
To show Bpi (E) ⊆ [Y
p
i ], note that by (A1) and monotonicity of B
p
i , we have, for each k ∈ N, that
Bpi (E) ⊆ B
p
i (Ek−1) = [Y
p
i (k)] .
As the inclusion holds for all k ∈ N:
Bpi (E) ⊆
⋂
k∈N[Y
p
i (k)] = [Y
p
i ] .
To show Bpi (E) ⊇ [Y
p
i ], assume that ω ∈ [Y
p
i ].
14 This implies that ω ∈ [Ypi (k)] for all k, and,
using (A1): ω ∈ Bpi (Ek) for all k. Since Ek = Ωi × projΩ−i Ek, we have that E
ωi
k = projΩ−i Ek. It
follows that
µi(ti(ω))(projΩ−i Ek) ≥ p for all k .
Thus, since 〈Ek〉k is a decreasing chain with limit E,
µi(ti(ω))(projΩ−i E) ≥ p .
Since E = Ωi × projΩ−i E, we have that Eωi = projΩ−i E. Hence, the inequality implies that ω ∈
Bpi (E).
Proof of Proposition 4. Let X ∈ S be the smallest CURB set containing C(Y): (i) C(Y) ⊆ X and
β(X) ⊆ X and (ii) there exists no X′ ∈ S with C(Y) ⊆ X′ and β(X′) ⊆ X′ ( X. We must show that
X = E(Y).
Consider the sequence 〈Y(k)〉k defined by Y(0) = Y and condition (4) for each k ∈ N and
i ∈ N. We show, by induction, that C(Y(k)) ⊆ X for all k ∈ N. By assumption, Y(0) = Y ∈ T
satisfies this condition. Assume that C(Y(k− 1)) ⊆ X for some k ∈ N, and fix i ∈ N. Then, ∀j 6= i,
β j(margS−jµj(tj(ω))) ⊆ Xj if ω ∈ [Yj(k − 1)] and sj(ω) ∈ Xj if, in addition, ω ∈ Rj. Hence, if
ω ∈ B1i
(⋂
j 6=i
(
Rj ∩ [Yj(k − 1)]
))
, then margS−iµi(ti(ω)) ∈ M(X−i) and Ci(ti(ω)) ⊆ βi(X−i) ⊆ Xi.
Since this holds for all i ∈ N, we have C(Y(k)) ⊆ X. This completes the induction.
Secondly, since the sequence 〈Y(k)〉k is non-decreasing and C(·) is monotonic with respect to
set inclusion, and the game is finite, there exist a k′ ∈ N and some X′ ⊆ X such that C(Y(k)) = X′
for all k ≥ k′. Let k > k′ and consider any player i ∈ N. Since the probability structure is complete,
there exists, for each σ−i ∈ M(X′−i) a state ω ∈ [Yi(k)] with margS−iµi(ti(ω)) = σ−i, implying that
βi(X′−i) ⊆ Ci(Yi(k)) = X′i . Since this holds for all i ∈ N, β(X′) ⊆ X′. Therefore, if X′ ( X would hold,
then this would contradict that there exists no X′ ∈ S with C(Y) ⊆ X′ such that β(X′) ⊆ X′ ( X.
Hence, X = C (
⋃
k∈N Y(k)) = E(Y).
14 We thank Itai Arieli for suggesting this proof of the reversed inclusion, shorter than our original proof. A proof of both
inclusions can also be based on property (8) of Monderer and Samet [30].
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Write X = E(Y). To establish that X is epistemically robust, by Proposition 2(b), it is sufficient to
show that
X ⊆ ×i∈Nβi(β−1i (Xi)) ,
keeping in mind that, for all X′ ∈ S , X′ ⊇ ×i∈Nβi(β−1i (X′i)).
Fix i ∈ N. Define Y′i ∈ T by taking Y′i := {ti ∈ Ti | Ci(ti) ⊆ Xi}. Since the probability structure
is complete, it follows that Ci(Y′i ) = βi(β
−1
i (Xi)). Furthermore, for all k ∈ N, Y(k) ⊆ Y′ and, hence,⋃
k∈N Y(k) ⊆ Y′. This implies that
Xi = C
(⋃
k∈NY(k)
)
⊆ Ci(Y′i ) = βi(β−1i (Xi)),
since Ci(·) is monotonic with respect to set inclusion.
Proof of Proposition 5. (Only if) Let X ∈ S be a MINCURB set. Let t ∈ T satisfy margS−i µi(ti)(X−i) = 1
for all i ∈ N. By construction, C({t}) ⊆ X, as X is a CURB set. By Proposition 4, E({t}) is the smallest
CURB set with C({t}) ⊆ E({t}). But then E({t}) ⊆ X. The inclusion cannot be strict, as X is a MINCURB
set. Hence, there exists a t ∈ T such that E({t}) = X. Moreover, as E({t′}) is a CURB set for all t′ ∈ T
and X is a MINCURB set, there exists no t′ ∈ T such that E({t′}) ( X.
(If) Assume that there exists a t ∈ T such that E({t}) = X and there exists no t′ ∈ T such that
E({t′}) ( X. Since E({t}) = X, it follows from Proposition 4 that X is a CURB set. To show that
X is a minimal CURB set, suppose—to the contrary—that there is a CURB set X′ ( X. Let t′ ∈ T
be such that margS−i µi(t
′
i)(X
′
−i) = 1 for each i ∈ N. By construction, C({t′}) ⊆ X′, so X′ is a
CURB set containing C({t′}). By Proposition 4, E({t′}) is the smallest CURB set containing C({t′}).
However, by assumption, there exists no t′ ∈ T such that E({t′}) ( X, so it must be that E({t′}) ⊇ X.
This contradicts X′ ( X.
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